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A	  wide	  range	  of	  colonial	  practices	  have	  had	  significant	  and	  long-­‐lasting	  effects	  around	  the	  globe:	  
almost	  every	  present-­‐day	  country,	  or	  their	  precursor,	  was	  a	  colonial	  power,	  subject	  to	  colonial	  
oppression,	  or	  both.	  Many	  have	  debated	  how	  best	  to	  understand	  the	  present	  day	  impact	  of	  
particular	  colonial	  enterprises:	  asking	  whether	  they	  have	  caused	  persistent	  and	  enduring	  harm;	  
whether	  they	  might	  have	  led	  to	  beneficial	  long-­‐term	  outcomes;	  and	  indeed	  whether	  the	  language	  of	  
net	  harm	  and	  benefit	  is	  the	  right	  way	  to	  conceptualise	  past	  injustice	  which	  often	  involved	  terrible	  
and	  grievous	  wrongdoing	  (Butt	  2015).	  But	  while	  there	  is	  debate	  as	  to	  the	  character	  of	  colonialism’s	  
legacy,	  there	  is	  no	  questioning	  its	  scope	  and	  extent.	  We	  all	  live	  in	  a	  postcolonial	  world	  –	  indeed,	  
many	  argue	  that	  not	  just	  the	  memory	  but	  the	  actuality	  of	  colonialism	  persists	  in	  the	  present	  through	  
structural	  features	  of	  international	  economic	  and	  political	  institutions	  which	  work	  to	  the	  benefit	  of	  
the	  rich	  and	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  the	  global	  poor.	  So	  there	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  both	  historical	  and	  
contemporary	  colonialism	  are	  of	  great	  import	  to	  the	  issue	  which	  theorists	  of	  distributive	  justice	  seek	  
to	  address:	  what	  constitutes	  a	  fair	  distribution	  of	  benefits	  and	  burdens	  within	  a	  given	  society.	  Yet	  
the	  question	  of	  what	  distributive	  justice	  means	  in	  a	  postcolonial	  context	  specifically	  has	  received	  
remarkably	  little	  scholarly	  attention.	  Two	  themes	  become	  readily	  apparent	  when	  one	  reads	  the	  
work	  of	  postcolonial	  writers	  and	  of	  theorists	  of	  distributive	  justice.	  The	  first	  is	  that	  there	  is	  relatively	  
little	  discussion	  of	  distributive	  justice	  in	  postcolonial	  political	  theory.	  The	  second	  is	  that	  there	  is	  
relatively	  little	  discussion	  of	  colonialism	  in	  the	  literature	  on	  distributive	  justice.	  Of	  course	  there	  are	  
exceptions	  to	  these	  generalisations,	  and	  recent	  years	  have	  seen	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  new	  body	  of	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work	  drawing	  usefully	  from	  both	  traditions,	  developing	  what	  might	  be	  termed	  critical	  theories	  of	  
postcolonial	  distributive	  justice.	  
Postcolonial	  political	  theory	  has	  avoided	  focussing	  on	  questions	  of	  distributive	  justice	  for	  a	  number	  
of	  reasons.	  This	  is	  partly	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  trajectory	  of	  postcolonial	  studies,	  as	  compared	  to	  
much	  mainstream	  liberal	  theory.	  Distributive	  justice	  has	  been	  the	  central	  topic	  in	  analytical	  political	  
theory	  since	  the	  publication	  of	  John	  Rawls’s	  A	  Theory	  of	  Justice	  in	  1971.	  Rawls’s	  influential	  work	  is	  an	  
exercise	  in	  ideal	  theory:	  he	  imagines	  a	  closed	  society,	  understood	  as	  constituting	  a	  shared	  scheme	  of	  
mutually	  beneficial	  social	  cooperation	  over	  time,	  which	  is	  characterised	  by	  “full	  compliance”:	  its	  
members	  share	  a	  sense	  of	  justice	  and	  fufil	  their	  moral	  obligations	  to	  one	  another.	  Rawls’s	  inquiry	  
concerns	  the	  principles	  of	  justice	  that	  should	  regulate	  the	  basic	  structure	  of	  this	  idealised	  society:	  
one	  works	  out	  what	  a	  just	  society	  would	  look	  like	  before	  thinking	  about	  what	  happens	  in	  the	  real	  
world	  (Rawls	  1971,	  8-­‐9).	  By	  contrast,	  postcolonial	  political	  theory	  starts	  from	  the	  avowedly	  non-­‐
ideal:	  the	  reality	  of	  colonial	  subjugation.	  Writers	  such	  as	  W.E.B.	  Du	  Bois,	  Mahatma	  Ghandi,	  and	  
Frantz	  Fanon	  grounded	  their	  work	  in	  their	  lived	  experience	  as	  oppressed	  subjects.	  Their	  subject	  was	  
liberation:	  in	  the	  first	  instance,	  for	  particular	  peoples	  in	  particular	  places.	  Distributive	  questions	  do	  
arise	  in	  such	  writings:	  much	  colonial	  practice	  was	  motivated	  by	  material	  considerations,	  and	  indeed	  
we	  might	  identify	  the	  exploitation	  of	  colonised	  peoples	  as	  one	  of	  three	  defining	  characteristics	  of	  
colonialism,	  along	  with	  political	  domination	  and	  cultural	  imposition	  (Butt	  2013).	  Instances	  of	  
exploitation	  such	  as	  the	  Atlantic	  slave	  trade,	  the	  misappropriation	  of	  natural	  resources	  and	  cultural	  
property,	  the	  establishment	  of	  exploitative	  trade	  relations,	  and	  the	  forcible	  introduction	  of	  capitalist	  
forms	  of	  production	  have	  had	  enduring	  effects	  which	  need	  to	  be	  brought	  into	  any	  post-­‐imperial	  
reckoning.	  Yet	  it	  is	  unsurprising	  that	  writers	  in	  postcolonial	  studies	  have	  typically	  shied	  away	  from	  
the	  language	  of	  distributive	  justice.	  We	  might	  broadly	  divide	  postcolonial	  writing	  into	  two	  strands,	  
which	  Margaret	  Kohn	  categorises	  as	  “Post-­‐colonial	  Theory”	  and	  “Theories	  of	  Decolonization”	  (Kohn	  
2010,	  203).	  Within	  the	  former,	  which	  Kohn	  describes	  as	  focussing	  on	  the	  issues	  of	  “hybridity,	  
diaspora,	  representation,	  narrative,	  and	  knowledge/power”	  (209),	  prominent	  authors	  such	  as	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Edward	  Said	  and	  Gayatri	  Chakravorty	  Spivak	  have	  concentrated	  on	  the	  cultural,	  rather	  than	  the	  
distributive,	  effects	  of	  colonialism’s	  legacy,	  stressing	  how	  power	  is	  reinforced,	  and	  oppression	  
maintained,	  by	  forms	  of	  cultural	  representation	  (Said	  1978;	  Spivak	  1988).	  This	  suggests	  an	  
understanding	  of	  justice	  and	  injustice	  which	  goes	  well	  beyond	  Rawls’s	  focus	  on	  the	  “basic	  structure”	  
of	  society:	  cultural	  domination	  can	  take	  many	  forms,	  from	  the	  political	  to	  the	  personal.	  Theories	  of	  
decolonization,	  Kohn	  writes,	  focus	  on	  “revolution,	  economic	  inequality,	  violence,	  and	  political	  
identity”	  (Kohn	  2010,	  209).	  While	  this	  may	  seem	  closer	  to	  the	  concerns	  of	  distributive	  theorists,	  this	  
tradition	  is	  significantly	  influenced	  by	  (while	  often	  departing	  from)	  Marxist	  thought	  (Young	  2001,	  
167-­‐181),	  and	  as	  such,	  typically	  displays	  both	  a	  deep	  distrust	  of	  the	  bourgeois	  state,	  which	  often	  
plays	  the	  role	  of	  the	  agent	  of	  justice	  in	  liberal	  theories	  of	  distributive	  justice,	  and	  of	  the	  supposedly	  
universal	  vocabulary	  of	  terms	  such	  as	  justice,	  rights,	  and	  property,	  which	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  writers	  such	  
as	  John	  Locke	  and	  John	  Stuart	  Mill	  were	  used	  in	  explicit	  ideological	  defence	  of	  Empire.	  Dipesh	  
Chakrabrty	  writes	  that	  the	  postcolonial	  project	  “must	  ground	  itself	  in	  a	  radical	  critique	  and	  
transcendence	  of	  liberalism	  (i.e.	  of	  the	  bureaucratic	  constructions	  of	  citizenship,	  modern	  state,	  and	  
bourgeois	  privacy	  that	  classical	  political	  philosophy	  has	  produced),	  a	  ground	  that	  late	  Marx	  shares	  
with	  certain	  moments	  in	  both	  poststructuralist	  thought	  and	  feminist	  philosophy”	  (Chakrabrty	  1992,	  
20).	  Insofar	  as	  postcolonial	  thinking	  seeks	  to	  disrupt	  and	  transform	  existing	  normative	  orders,	  it	  
poses	  a	  challenge	  to	  both	  the	  discourse	  and	  the	  methodology	  of	  much	  analytical	  work	  on	  
distributive	  justice.	  
Just	  as	  postcolonial	  studies	  have	  avoided	  the	  language	  of	  distributive	  justice,	  so	  much	  work	  on	  
distributive	  justice	  has	  paid	  scant	  regard	  to	  the	  aftermath	  of	  Empire,	  even	  when	  explicitly	  discussing	  
questions	  of	  global	  justice.	  John	  Rawls’s	  work	  on	  international	  political	  theory,	  The	  Law	  of	  Peoples,	  is	  
notoriously	  lacking	  in	  this	  regard:	  indeed,	  Charles	  Mills	  notes	  “nowhere	  in	  any	  of	  Rawls’s	  five	  directly	  
authored	  books	  (or	  the	  two	  lecture	  collections)	  is	  there	  any	  mention	  of	  Native	  Americans,	  the	  
Atlantic	  Slave	  Trade,	  European	  colonialism	  and	  imperialism,	  the	  genocide	  of	  indigenous	  populations,	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or	  the	  reality	  of	  systemic	  Euro-­‐domination	  on	  a	  global	  scale.”(Mills	  2015a,	  18)	  Mills	  argues	  that	  this	  
neglect	  of	  postcolonial	  corrective	  justice,	  and	  of	  racial	  justice	  in	  particular,	  is	  symptomatic	  of	  much	  
contemporary	  work	  on	  global	  justice,	  noting	  the	  field's	  “almost	  complete	  marginalization	  of...	  
colonial	  history.	  The	  contenders	  in	  the	  debate	  will	  be	  egalitarianism,	  cosmopolitanism,	  the	  
difference	  principle,	  positive	  rights,	  and	  so	  forth.	  But	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  West	  owes	  rectificatory	  
justice	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  planet	  because	  of	  its	  benefit	  from	  centuries	  of	  colonial	  and	  racial	  
exploitation	  will	  rarely	  be	  raised."	  (Mills	  2015a,	  22)	  For	  Mills,	  the	  displacement	  of	  compensatory	  
justice	  to	  the	  margins	  of	  normative	  concern,	  an	  afterthought	  to	  be	  belatedly	  considered	  following	  
the	  establishment	  of	  ideal	  theories	  of	  distributive	  justice,	  is	  itself	  a	  manifestation	  of	  the	  colonial	  
character	  of	  Western	  political	  theory.	  This	  said,	  one	  can	  point	  to	  some	  recent	  work	  within	  analytical	  
theory	  which	  seeks	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  postcolonial	  tradition	  by	  bringing	  together	  ideas	  
of	  corrective	  and	  distributive	  justice.	  
Most	  straightforwardly,	  some	  argue	  that	  existing	  theories	  of	  global	  distributive	  justice	  neglect	  how	  
colonial	  exploitation	  forms	  the	  backdrop	  to	  contemporary	  schemes	  of	  socio-­‐economic	  distribution.	  
Ypi,	  Goodin,	  and	  Barry	  argue	  that	  historic	  forms	  of	  association	  which	  characterised	  colonialism	  give	  
rise	  to	  extensive	  duties	  of	  distributive	  justice	  in	  the	  present.	  They	  consider	  two	  forms	  of	  social	  
relation	  which,	  some	  claim,	  ground	  distributive	  justice:	  the	  Coercion	  Account,	  when	  being	  subject	  to	  
the	  pervasive	  impact	  of	  the	  same	  coercive	  authority	  is	  sufficient	  to	  give	  rise	  to	  associative	  duties,	  
and	  the	  Cooperation	  Account,	  whereby	  associative	  duties	  arise	  whenever	  members	  cooperate	  in	  
some	  joint	  venture.	  These	  subjects	  are	  much	  discussed	  within	  the	  global	  justice	  literature	  with	  
reference	  to	  the	  present	  day	  international	  order.	  Some	  cosmopolitans	  argue	  that	  the	  extent	  of	  
globalization	  and	  international	  interdependence	  means	  that	  the	  world	  should	  be	  considered	  a	  single	  
scheme	  of	  social	  cooperation	  with	  a	  shared	  basic	  structure,	  and	  so	  subject	  to	  principles	  of	  global	  
distributive	  justice	  (see	  Beitz	  1979,	  Buchanan	  2000),	  whereas	  statists	  argue	  that	  the	  extent	  of	  
coercion	  and/or	  cooperation	  between	  states	  is	  less	  than	  that	  within	  states,	  meaning	  that	  different	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principles	  of	  distributive	  justice	  apply	  nationally	  and	  internationally	  (Blake	  2002,	  Sangiovanni	  2007).	  
Ypi	  et	  al	  maintain	  that	  regardless	  of	  one’s	  contemporary	  perspective,	  one	  should	  accept	  that	  colonial	  
practices	  gave	  rise	  to	  shared	  systems	  of	  coercion	  and	  cooperation	  which	  triggered	  historic	  duties	  of	  
distributive	  justice,	  which	  went	  unfulfilled	  during	  the	  colonial	  period,	  at	  the	  point	  of	  decolonization,	  
and	  subsequently	  up	  to	  the	  present	  day.	  The	  result	  is	  a	  complicated	  package	  of	  obligations	  of	  both	  
corrective	  and	  distributive	  justice,	  which	  rather	  than	  fading	  with	  the	  passage	  of	  time,	  may	  grow	  
more	  and	  more	  significant	  with	  the	  addition	  of	  compound	  interest	  (Ypi,	  Goodin,	  and	  Barry	  2005,	  
125).	  	  Since	  Ypi	  et	  al	  argue	  for	  what	  they	  call	  “robust”	  principles	  of	  distributive	  justice	  domestically	  
(such	  as	  egalitarianism),	  it	  follows	  that	  those	  who	  accept	  such	  principles	  in	  relation	  to	  their	  fellow	  
nationals	  should	  also	  accept	  they	  extend	  on	  a	  much	  wider	  scale,	  “to	  everyone	  in	  one's	  colonies,	  ex-­‐
colonies,	  and,	  indeed,	  fellow	  colonies	  and	  fellow	  ex-­‐colonies”.	  (135)	  	  
One	  can	  maintain	  that	  similar	  very	  extensive	  distributive	  duties	  apply	  in	  the	  present	  day	  without	  
invoking	  controversial	  theories	  of	  distributive	  justice	  such	  as	  liberal	  egalitarianism.	  Some	  have	  
argued	  that	  even	  relatively	  uncontroversial	  principles	  of	  corrective	  justice	  can	  have	  dramatic	  
distributive	  implications	  when	  one	  takes	  seriously	  the	  scale	  of	  historical	  colonialism,	  and	  appreciates	  
the	  extent	  to	  which	  not	  only	  past	  wrongdoing	  but	  subsequent	  failures	  to	  fulfil	  rectificatory	  duties	  
can	  give	  rise	  to	  weighty	  present	  day	  reparative	  obligations.	  Daniel	  Butt	  articulates	  three	  morally	  
relevant	  forms	  of	  connection	  between	  past	  and	  present,	  each	  of	  which	  can	  independently	  give	  rise	  
to	  contemporary	  reparative	  duties,	  grounded	  in	  benefit,	  entitlement,	  and	  responsibility	  (Butt	  2009:	  
17).	  Ideas	  of	  benefit	  are	  invoked	  when	  it	  is	  maintained	  that	  present	  day	  parties	  are	  advantaged,	  and	  
others	  disadvantaged,	  by	  the	  automatic	  effects	  of	  historic	  injustice:	  a	  common	  feature	  of	  debates	  
over	  the	  lasting	  effects	  of	  colonialism.	  Entitlement	  claims	  maintain	  that	  contemporary	  individuals	  or	  
groups	  are	  in	  possession	  of	  property	  to	  which	  others	  have	  inherited	  entitlements.	  Colonial	  examples	  
range	  from	  specific	  cases	  of	  cultural	  property	  taken	  during	  the	  colonial	  era,	  such	  as	  the	  Benin	  
Bronzes	  currently	  displayed	  in	  London’s	  British	  Museum,	  to	  claims	  for	  reparations	  for	  present	  day	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African-­‐Americans	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  inheritance	  of	  wages	  which	  should	  have	  historically	  been	  paid	  
to	  slaves,	  or	  land	  wrongly	  seized	  from	  blacks	  in	  slavery’s	  aftermath	  (Coates	  2014;	  Craemer	  2015).	  
Finally,	  claims	  grounded	  in	  responsibility	  arise	  when	  present	  day	  parties	  are	  members	  of	  historically	  
continuous	  communities	  that	  bear	  ongoing	  responsibility	  for	  failing	  to	  fulfil	  rectificatory	  duties.	  Such	  
ideas	  are	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  current	  legal	  controversies	  over	  reparations	  for	  colonialism,	  such	  as	  
attempts	  to	  hold	  the	  British	  Government	  accountable	  for	  torture	  perpetrated	  during	  the	  Mau	  Mau	  
uprising	  in	  Kenya	  in	  the	  1950s,	  or	  moves	  by	  the	  CARICOM	  countries	  of	  the	  Caribbean	  to	  sue	  former	  
colonial	  powers	  such	  as	  the	  UK,	  France,	  and	  the	  Netherlands.	  Claims	  under	  all	  three	  headings	  are	  
philosophically	  controversial,	  and	  successful	  claims	  for	  reparation	  will	  have	  to	  contend	  with	  a	  
number	  of	  objections,	  including	  claims	  about	  the	  counterfactual	  course	  history	  would	  have	  taken	  in	  
colonialism’s	  absence,	  scepticism	  relating	  to	  the	  persistence	  of	  property	  rights	  when	  not	  in	  the	  
physical	  possession	  of	  their	  rightful	  owners,	  and	  worries	  about	  how	  significant	  historical	  events	  
change	  not	  only	  the	  course	  of	  history	  but	  the	  identity	  of	  present	  day	  individuals,	  who	  would	  not	  
have	  come	  into	  existence	  were	  it	  not	  for	  the	  events	  in	  question	  (Waldron	  1992,	  Thompson	  2002).	  
Two	  points	  could	  be	  made	  in	  response.	  First,	  these	  three	  backward	  looking	  rationales	  need	  not	  be	  
seen	  as	  distinct	  and	  independent:	  the	  case	  for	  reparations	  seems	  strongest	  when	  one	  observes	  that	  
all	  three	  frequently	  apply	  simultaneously	  in	  many	  postcolonial	  contexts.	  Second,	  the	  relationship	  
between	  distributive	  justice	  and	  corrective	  justice	  here	  is	  complicated	  and	  under-­‐theorised.	  Some	  
writers	  have	  sought	  to	  separate	  the	  two,	  and	  maintain	  that	  reparative	  claims	  are	  secondary	  to	  
forward-­‐looking	  claims	  of	  distributive	  justice	  (Wenar,	  2006).	  We	  may	  alternatively	  hold	  that	  
corrective	  justice	  has	  independent,	  and	  potentially	  greater,	  moral	  force:	  this	  may	  provide	  a	  distinct	  
rationale	  for	  international	  redistribution	  with	  greater	  popular	  appeal	  than	  that	  mustered	  by	  abstract	  
principles	  of	  distributive	  justice	  such	  as	  cosmopolitanism	  (Butt	  2009,	  Mills	  2015b).	  	  
Such	  arguments	  maintain	  that	  mainstream	  theories	  of	  distributive	  justice	  do	  not	  pay	  sufficient	  
attention	  to	  how	  past	  actions	  can	  give	  rise	  to	  rights	  and	  obligations	  in	  the	  present	  day,	  and	  so	  argue	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for	  a	  different	  distribution	  of	  benefits	  and	  burdens	  within	  and	  between	  modern	  societies.	  Some	  
recent	  work	  on	  reparative	  justice,	  however,	  has	  a	  different	  character,	  directly	  engaging	  with	  
postcolonial	  theory’s	  focus	  on	  oppression	  and	  liberation.	  Particularly	  influential	  in	  this	  regard	  has	  
been	  Iris	  Marion	  Young’s	  attempt	  to	  move	  beyond	  liberalism’s	  “distributive	  paradigm”.	  Young	  
advocates	  a	  consideration	  of	  both	  socio-­‐econonomic	  and	  cultural	  inequality,	  arguing	  that	  “the	  
concepts	  of	  domination	  and	  oppression,	  rather	  than	  the	  concept	  of	  distribution,	  should	  be	  the	  
starting	  point	  for	  a	  conception	  of	  social	  justice”(2011,	  16),	  and	  articulating	  five	  “faces	  of	  
oppression”:	  exploitation,	  marginalization,	  powerlessness,	  cultural	  imperialism,	  and	  violence.	  All	  find	  
ready	  counterparts	  within	  postcolonial	  studies.	  Young	  explicitly	  differentiates	  her	  structural	  model	  
of	  “social	  connection”	  from	  “liability”	  based	  approaches	  which	  conceive	  of	  responsibility	  for	  injustice	  
in	  terms	  of	  blameworthy	  conduct.	  Such	  an	  approach,	  in	  her	  view,	  understates	  the	  structural	  
character	  of	  contemporary	  injustice,	  which	  “exists	  when	  social	  processes	  put	  large	  groups	  of	  persons	  
under	  systematic	  threat	  of	  domination	  or	  deprivation	  of	  the	  means	  to	  develop	  and	  exercise	  their	  
capacities,	  at	  the	  same	  time	  that	  these	  processes	  enable	  others	  to	  dominate	  or	  to	  have	  a	  wider	  
range	  of	  opportunities	  for	  developing	  and	  exercising	  capacities	  open	  to	  them.”	  (Young	  2011,	  52).	  A	  
range	  of	  everyday	  activities	  unavoidably	  make	  citizens	  of	  affluent	  states	  complicit	  in	  structural	  
injustice,	  as	  they	  contribute	  to	  the	  processes	  that	  produce	  unjust	  outcomes.	  Such	  ideas	  are	  at	  the	  
heart	  of	  Catherine	  Lu’s	  influential	  work	  on	  colonialism	  as	  structural	  injustice,	  which	  charges	  a	  wide	  
range	  of	  contemporary	  agents	  with	  political	  responsibility	  to	  seek	  to	  eliminate	  persisting	  social	  
disadvantages	  stemming	  from	  the	  colonial	  past	  (Lu,	  2011).	  Jeff	  Spinner-­‐Halev	  focuses	  on	  “radical	  
injustice”,	  stemming	  from	  the	  enduring	  effects	  of	  past	  wrongdoing	  that	  result	  in	  cultural	  breakdown,	  
harming	  communities’	  identities	  so	  that	  they	  can	  no	  longer	  “feel	  at	  home	  in	  the	  world”	  (Spinner-­‐
Halev	  2012).	  Duncan	  Ivison’s	  Postcolonial	  Liberalism	  articulates	  a	  vision	  of	  a	  postcolonial	  liberal	  
order	  incorporating	  both	  indigenous	  and	  non-­‐indigenous	  groups	  which	  draws	  upon	  liberal	  accounts	  
of	  distributive	  justice,	  such	  as	  Martha	  Nussbaum’s	  “capabilities	  approach”,	  while	  also	  stressing	  the	  
importance	  of	  self	  government	  and	  group	  determination.	  Rather	  than	  seeking	  the	  realization	  of	  a	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particular	  distributive	  pattern,	  he	  describes	  a	  dynamic	  process	  of	  accommodation	  and	  recognition	  
that	  “can	  not	  be	  prescribed	  or	  pre-­‐determined	  in	  advance	  of	  the	  understandings	  and	  choices	  of	  
indigenous	  people	  themselves”	  (Ivison	  2002,	  160-­‐1).	  Finally,	  Sara	  Amighettit	  and	  Alasia	  Nuti’s	  recent	  
work	  on	  reparative	  justice	  argues	  against	  a	  “unilateral”	  approach	  to	  rectification	  whereby	  former	  
colonies	  decide	  what	  should	  be	  done	  in	  response	  to	  their	  own	  past	  wrongdoing,	  arguing	  not	  for	  a	  
particular	  reparative	  outcome	  but	  for	  a	  process	  of	  shared	  deliberation	  in	  pursuit	  of	  contemporary	  
redress.	  Neglecting	  the	  active	  contribution	  that	  victims	  can	  make	  to	  such	  processes	  is	  not	  only	  
problematic	  epistemically,	  in	  terms	  of	  understanding	  the	  character	  of	  the	  injustice,	  but	  also	  in	  
relation	  to	  the	  agency	  of	  the	  oppressed:	  a	  conception	  of	  redress	  “that	  treats	  the	  former	  enslaved	  
and	  colonized	  as	  passive	  recipients	  is	  likely	  to	  reinforce	  a	  discursive	  frame	  that	  reactivates	  the	  same	  
social	  categories	  used	  to	  justify	  these	  injustices”	  (Amighetti	  and	  Nuti,	  2015).	  	  Such	  approaches	  do	  
not	  neglect	  distributive	  concerns,	  but	  they	  both	  reflect,	  and	  draw	  explicitly	  upon,	  postcolonial	  
objections	  to	  the	  limitations	  of	  traditional	  liberal	  distributive	  theory.	  The	  door	  is	  at	  least	  opening	  to	  
further	  exchange	  between	  these	  two	  traditions,	  and	  a	  more	  sophisticated	  understanding	  of	  what	  is	  
owed	  in	  colonialism’s	  aftermath.	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